{"image_url":null,"author_name":"at_sue","url":"https://hoppingaround.hatenablog.com/entry/2010/05/12/182203","author_url":"https://blog.hatena.ne.jp/at_sue/","height":"190","version":"1.0","blog_title":"hopping around","width":"100%","published":"2010-05-12 18:22:03","provider_url":"https://hatena.blog","blog_url":"https://hoppingaround.hatenablog.com/","html":"<iframe src=\"https://hatenablog-parts.com/embed?url=https%3A%2F%2Fhoppingaround.hatenablog.com%2Fentry%2F2010%2F05%2F12%2F182203\" title=\"job rotation - hopping around\" class=\"embed-card embed-blogcard\" scrolling=\"no\" frameborder=\"0\" style=\"display: block; width: 100%; height: 190px; max-width: 500px; margin: 10px 0px;\"></iframe>","type":"rich","provider_name":"Hatena Blog","categories":["Econ"],"title":"job rotation","description":"Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation ANDREW HERTZBERG, JOSE MARIA LIBERTI, and DANIEL PARAVISINI The abstract: We present evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate moral hazard in communication. A rotation policy that routinely reassigns lo\u2026"}